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Abstract - This paper presents a novel approach for a (key 
distribution) for secret message communication among a group (G). 
In order to increase security to distribute secret message (key), we 
introduce sponge functions using these at a specific permutation. We 
generate a key and distribute this key using (PKCS)(public key crypto 
systems), the absorbing, squeezing functions are used. In this paper 
an introduction part which briefs regarding sponge functions, key 
distribution centre, group communication and NTRU, key generation 
authentication, in literature review we describe about the research 
states of sponge functions, lightweight hash functions-KDC – NTRU. 
In proposed work we propose how the group communication 
establishes registration of users, entry and exit of a user. The 
encryption and decryption algorithm are used between sender and 
receiver. The entire proposed work is verified in VHDL and 
‘MATLABS’.     
[Keywords : Sponge function; NTRU; encryption; decryption; 
Keydistributioncenter (KDC) Absorbing; Squeezing functions] 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Designers of lightweight cryptographic algorithms or protocols 
have to trade off  between two opposite design phi mlosophies. 
The first consists in creating new schemes from scratch, 
whereas the second consists in reusing available schemes and 
adapting them to system constraints. They are more  in line 
with the latter approach—as illustrated by their DM-
PRESENT proposal—we ten more towards the former. 
Although QUARK borrows components from previous works, 
it integrates a number of innovations that make it unique and 
that optimize its light weightness. As explained in this section, 
QUARK combines    a sponge construction with a capacity c 
equal to the digest length n, a core permutation inspired by 
previous primitives, optimized for reduced resources 
consumption. This design strategy as an attempt to optimize its 
security-performance ratio. Subsequent proposals of 
lightweight hash functions followed a similar strategy, with 
PHOTON and SPONGENT respectively building their core 
permutations on AES- and SERPENT-like algorithms. 
 
II. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
I. Separating digest length and security level  
We observe that the digest length of a hash function has 
generally been identified with its security level, with (say) n-
bit digests being equivalent to n-bit security against preimage 
attacks. However, this rule restricts the variety of designs, as it 
forces designers to exclude design paradigms that may 
otherwise increase usability or performance the notation 
introduced in the context of sponge finctions[13] was first step 
towards a separation of digest length and security level, and 
thus towards more inventive designs. In particular, the 
necessity of n-bit (second) preimage resistance is questionable 
from a pragmatic standpoint, when one needs to assume that 
2n/2 is an infeasible effort, to avoid birthday collision search. 
Designers may thus relax the security requirements against 
(second) preimages—as informally suggested by several 
researchers in the context of the SHA-3 Competition—so as to 
propose more efficient algorithms[13].  
 
III Working with shift registers  
In cryptography, linear or non-linear feedback shift registers 
have been widely used as a building block of stream ciphers, 
thanks to their simplicity and efficiency of implementation (be 
it in terms of area or power consumption). In the design of 
QUARK, we opt for an algorithm based on bit shift registers 
combined with(non-linear) Boolean functions, rather than for a 
design based on S-boxes combined with a linear layer (as 
PHOTON and SPONGENT). This is motivated by the 
simplicity of description and of implementation, and by the 
close-to-optimal area requirements it induces. Indeed, the 
register serves both to store the internal state (mandatory in 
any construction) and to perform the operations bringing 
confusion and diffusion .  
 
IV Description of the QUARK hash family 
This section gives a complete specification of QUARK and of 
its three proposed instances: U-QUARK, D-QUARK, and S-
QUARK. In particle physics, the u-quark is lighter than the d-
quark, which itself is lighter than the s-quark; our eponym 
hash functions compare similarly. 
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Fig.1 Sponge Construction of a 4-block padded  Message 
 
2..Sponge construction 
QUARK uses the sponge construction, depicted in Fig. 1, and 
a 6-bit permutation P (that is, a bijective function over {0,1}b). 
Following the notations introduced a QUARK instance is 
parameterized by a rate (or block length) r, a capacity c, and 
an output length n. The width b = r+c of a sponge construction 
is the size of its internal state. We denote this internal state s = 
(S0 . .., Sb-1), where S0 is referred to as the first bit of the state. 
Given a predefined initial state of b bits (specified for each 
instance of Quark) the sponge construction processes a 
message m in three steps [4].  
  
1. Initialization: the message is padded by appending a '1' bit 
followed by the minimal (possibly zero) number of '0' bits 
to reach a length that is a multiple of r. 
2. Absorbing phase:   the r-bit message blocks are XOR's 
with the last r bits of the state (that is Sb-r ,….. Sb-2,,
 Sb-1) 
interleaved with applications of the permutation P.  The 
absorbing phase starts with an XOR between the first block 
and the state, and it finishes with a call to the permutation 
P. 
3. Squeezing phase: the last r bits of the state are returned as 
output, interleaved with applications of the permutation P, 
until n bits are returned. The squeezing phase starts with 
the extraction of r bits, and also finishes with the extraction 
of r bits. 
 
2.1.Permutation    
As depicted in Fig. the internal state of P is viewed as three 
feedback shift registers (FSRs) two non-linear ones (NFSRs) 
of b/2 bits each, and a linear one (LFSR) of [log 4b] bits. The 
state at epoch t ≥ 0 is thus composed of 
a. AnNFSRX ofb/2bits, denoted Xt = (X0
t,...Xtb/2-1). 
b. An NFSRY of b/2 bits, denoted Yt=(Y0
t,.....Ytb/2-
1).   
c. An LFSR L of [log 4b] bits,denoted  Lt= (L0
t......Lt׀log4b׀-1)    
d. Given a b-bit input, P proceeds in three stages, as          
described below. 
e. Initialization. Upon input of the b-bit internal state of the 
sponge construction  s = (S0, .. ., sb-1), P initializes its 
internal state as follows: 
  X is initialized with the first b/2 input                           
  bits:(X0
0,,... ,X0b/2-1):=(s0,......,Sb/2-1). 
  Y is initialized with the last b/2 input             
bits: (Y0
0
,……..Y
0
b/2-1):=(sb/2,…..sb-1).  
L is  initialized to the all-one string:   
(L0
0,…….,L0׀log4b׀-1) : =(1,…..1). 
 
4. State update 
From an internal state (Xt, Yt, Lt), the next state (Xt+1 ,Yt+1, 
Lt+1) is determined by clocking the internal mechanism as 
follows 
a. The function h is evaluated upon input bits from Xt,Yt, and 
Lt, and the result is written ht::= h(xt,Yt,Lt).       
b. X is clocked using Y0
T , the function  f, andht:   
c. (X0
t+1,…..Xb/2-1
t+1):=(X1
t,…..Xb/2-1,Y0
t+f(Xt) +ht ).  
d. Y is clocked using the function g and H=                                        
(Y0
t+1,…..Yb/2-1
t+1):= (Y1
t,…..Yb/2-1,g(Y
t)  +ht ). 
e. L is clocked using the function p:                                                     
(L0
t+1,…..Lt│log4b│-1):= (L1
t,….. Lt│log4b│-1 ,p(L
t)). 
 
Table 1 summarizes the parameters of the three instances 
proposed. 
U-QUARK is the lightest flavor of QUARK. It was designed 
to provide 128-bit preimage resistance and at least 64-bit 
security against all other attacks, and to admit a parallelization 
degree of 8. It has parameters r=8,c=128, b=136,n=136. 
 
 
 
Function f. Given a 68-bit register,x,f returns:-                    
X0+X9+X14+X21+X28+X33+X37+X45+X50+X5+X55X59 
+X33X37+X9X15+X45X52X55+X21+X28+X33                         
X9X28X45X59+X33X37X52X55+X21X28X33+X9X28X45X59+     
X33X37X52X55+X15X21X55X59+X37X45X52X55X59+                  
X37X45X52X55X59+X9X15X21X28X33+X21X28X33X37X45X52 .  
           D-QUARK is the second-lightest flavor of QUARK. It 
was designed to provide 160-bit preimage resistance and at 
least 80-bit security against all other attacks, and to admit a 
parallelization degree of 8. It has parameters r = 16, c = 160, b 
= 176, n = 176. 
 
Function f. D-QUARK uses the same function / as U-
QUARK, but with taps 0, 11, 18, 19, 27, 36, 42, 47, 58, 64, 67, 
71, 79 instead of 0, 9, 14, 15, 21, 28, 33, 37, 45, 50, 52, 55, 59, 
respectively. 
S-QUARK is the heaviest flavor of QUARK. It was designed 
to provide 224-bit preimage resistance and at least 112-bit 
security against all other attacks, and to admit a parallelization 
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degree of 16. It has parameters r = 32,              c = 224, b = 
256, n = 256. 
Function f. S-QUARK uses the same function / as U-
QUARK, but with taps 0, 16, 26, 28, 39, 52, 61, 69, 84, 94, 
97,103,111 instead of 0, 9, 14, 15, 21, 28, 33, 37, 45, 50, 52, 
55, 59, respectively. 
 
3.Keying QUARK 
As a sponge function, all results known on the sponge 
construction apply to QUARK. This includes proofs of 
security for keyed modes of operation, as described in . A 
keyed sponge function processes its input by simply hashing 
the string composed of the key followed by the said input. The 
following primitives can then be realized: 
Message authentication code (MAC); 
Pseudorandom generator; 
Stream cipher; 
Random-access stream cipher; 
Key derivation function. 
Furthermore, the QUARK instances can easily be modified to 
operate in the duplex construction (a variant of the sponge 
construction), to allow the realization of functionalities as 
authenticated encryption or  
 
3.1.A Brief Description of the Present Block Cipher 
Present is a 31-round SPN structure block cipher with block 
size of 64 bits, the cipher is described in fighre-. It supports 80 
and 128 –bit secret key. Firstly, the plaintext Xored subkey K  ׀  
as the input of the 1st  round alter 31 rounds iterations, the 31st  
round output Xored with the subkey K32 is the cipher text. 
Encryption Procedure. Each encryption round consists of the 
following  3 steps :- 
(1). Add RoundKey –AK : At the  beginning of each round 64 
bits output of the last round  function is  Xored with the 
subkey. 
(2) SBoxlayer–SL: The SL function{ }0,1  maps input 
(x0,x1,x2,x3) to output (y0,y1,y2,y3) , 16 identical 4-bit S-
boxes are used in parallel. The Boolean function of S-box 
is  y0= x0 +x2 +x3+x1x2.    
(3) Player PL : the ith bit is moved to bit position P(i) by a 
constant permutation table Figure 1.Overview of Present 
Encryption Algorithm 
 
4. KEY DISTRIBUTION 
Cryptography has for a long time conformed to the idea 
that the techniques used to protect sensitive data had 
themselves to be kept secret. Such principle, known as 
"cryptography by obscurity" has however become inadequate 
in our modern era. Cryptography, that has developed as a 
science in the 1970s and 1980s  allowed to move away from 
this historical picture and most of the modern cryptographic 
systems are now based on publicly announced algorithms 
while their security lies in the use of secret keys 
Distributing keys among a set of legitimate users while 
guaranteeing the secrecy of these keys with respect to any 
potential opponent is thus a central issue in cryptography, 
known as the Key Establishment Problem. 
 
 
Fig 3. Over view of Present Encryption Algorithm 
 
There are currently five families of cryptographic methods that 
can be used to solve the Key Establishment Problem between 
distant users: 
1. Classical Information-theoretic schemes 
2. Classical public-key cryptography 
3. Classical computationally secure symmetric-key 
cryptographic schemes 
4. Quantum Key Distribution 
5. Trusted couriers 
We will present how each of those cryptographic families can 
provide solutions to the Key Establishment problem and 
discuss, in each case, the type of security that can be provided. 
We will also consider a sixth type of Key Establishment 
schemes: hybrid schemes built by combining some of the 
methods listed above. 
 
4.1.Key Establishment based on public-key cryptography:- 
As shown by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman in 1976 , 
public-key cryptography can be used to establish a shared 
secret key over an unprotected classical communication 
channel, without using a prior shared secret. It thus provides a 
practical way to implement key distribution over open 
networks.  
 
4.1.1.Security of public-key cryptography Current 
asymmetric classical cryptographic schemes, such as RSA, are 
based on the difficulty to compute logarithms within a finite 
field. Today's implementations of RSA require to use private 
and public keys of at least 1024 bits, in order to offer a 
reasonable security margin against the computational efforts of 
an eavesdropper 1, and asymmetric keys of 2048 bits are 
preferable. It is also important to note that most of the 
currently used public-key cryptographic schemes (for example 
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RSA) could be cracked in polynomial time with a quantum 
computer: this results from Shor's algorithm for discrete log 
and factoring, that has a complexity of O(n3) [13]. 
 
4.1.2. Performance of public-key cryptography. Making the 
computations relative to the asymmetric cryptographic 
protocols (over keys longer than 1024 bits) is a rather 
computational intensive and time-consuming task. The 
performance of RSA-based key distribution implementations 
depend heavily on hardware : for RSA 2048 implemented on a 
recent PC (Pentium IV with a 2.1 GHz processor running 
under Windows XP), the computations needed for one key 
exchange (essentially one RSA encryption and one decryption) 
take roughly 30 ms . The same key exchange would be 
approximately 10 times faster (thus in the ms range) on 
dedicated coprocessors and 10 times slower (in the time range 
of a few tens of a second) on smart card coprocessors , 
Because of those relatively low exchange rates, public-key 
cryptography is most commonly used solely for initial session 
key distribution (in network protocols like SSL for example), 
and classical symmetric-key cryptography is then generally 
used for symmetric encryption and/or authentication of data. 
 
4.1.3.ClassicalComputationally Secure Symmetric key    
Cryptography and key Establishment  
Symmetric-key cryptography refers to cryptography methods 
in which both the sender and receiver share the same key. 
Symmetric-key encryption was the only kind of encryption 
publicly known until the discovery of public-key cryptography 
in 1976. Symmetric-key ciphers are used to guarantee the 
secrecy of the encrypted messages. The modern study of 
symmetric-key ciphers relates mainly to the study of block 
ciphers and stream ciphers and to their applications. AES is a 
block cipher that had been designed by a team of Belgium 
cryptographers (Joan Daemen et Vincent Rijmen) and has 
been adopted as an encryption standard by the US government 
(in replacement of DES). Block ciphers can be used to 
compute Message Authentication Codes (MACs) and can thus 
also be used to guarantee integrity and authenticity of 
messages. Stream ciphers, in contrast to the block ciphers, 
create an arbitrarily long stream of key material, which is 
combined with the plaintext bit-by-bit or character-by-
character, somewhat like the One-Time-Pad. We will not 
consider stream ciphers in the remaining part of this sub-
section, since, unlike block ciphers, they cannot be easily used 
to perform Key Establishment. 
 
4.1.4..Key Establishment based on Classical 
Computationally. Secure Symmetric-Key Cryptography Key 
Establishment can be realised by making use of only 
symmetric-key cryptographic primitives. Indeed, the 
combination of a symmetric-key encryption scheme with a 
symmetric-key authentication scheme allows one to build a 
Key Establishment primitive. Provided that a secret key is 
previously shared, symmetrically, by Alice and Bob, one can 
use a symmetric-key cipher to encrypt a message that will 
constitute the secret key for the key distribution protocol (this 
message can be random or not). Part of the previously shared 
symmetric key material can also be used to symmetrically 
compute (on Alice's side) and check (on Bob's side) a message 
authentication tag. Key Establishment based on symmetric-key 
cryptographic primitives are always based on a pre-established 
symmetric secret, needed for authentication. In this sense, they 
only allow Key Expansion more than Key Establishment. 
 
4.1.5. Security of classical computationally secure 
symmetric-key cryptography. The security of key distribution 
based on classical symmetric-key cryptography depends on the 
security of the cryptographic primitives that are used, and on 
the composability of those crypto primitives. Shannon has 
proven that there is no unconditionally secure encryption 
scheme which requires less key than a One-Time Pad, i.e., the 
number of key bits is at least as large as the length of the 
message . Hence, if we consider the possibility of building an 
unconditionally secure symmetric key expansion scheme, i.ev a 
method to symmetrically generate secret key out of a short 
initial symmetric shared secret key, the former results from 
Shannon tell us that such a scheme is impossible to achieve in 
the framework of classical cryptography. This is a 
fundamental limitation of any communication scheme relying 
solely on the exchange of classical messages since, in contrast 
to quantum messages, classical messages can be copied 
without errors. It is however possible to use classical 
symmetric-key encryption and authentication schemes, that are 
not unconditionally secure, to build a Key Establishment 
scheme. AES can for example be used for symmetric-key 
encryption and can be also used to compute message 
authentication codes (using AES-MAC). Note that the security 
model that applies to such symmetric-key classical encryption 
schemes (symmetric-key block ciphers and stream ciphers) is 
not unconditional security (the entropy of the key is smaller 
than the entropy of the message) and not even "provable 
computational security" (based on some proven upper bounds 
or on some equivalence between the complexity of the crypt-
analysis of a given cipher and another well-studied problem2). 
The security model that applies to classical symmetric-key 
cryptography can be called "practical computational security": 
a cryptographic scheme is considered "practically 
computationally secure" if the best-known attacks require too 
much resource (such as computation power, time, memory) by 
an acceptable margin The main problem with such a security 
model is that it is unable to guarantee anything about yet 
unknown attacks . There are no publicly known efficient 
quantum attacks on classical symmetric-key cryptographic 
schemes (but no proof that efficient attacks cannot be found), 
and the crypt-analysis of symmetric-key classical 
cryptography on a quantum computer reduces to exhaustive 
search. Here a quantum computer would thus still give an 
advantage: the complexity of exhaustive search in a unsorted 
database of N elements is of O(N) on a classical computer but 
only of O(VN) on a quantum computer. 
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Performances In terms of performance, symmetric-key 
classical cryptography is much faster and less computational 
intensive than asymmetric cryptography3. In terms of speed, 
there are now 128-bit AES encryptors able to encrypt data at 
rates in the Gbit/s range , This is the reason why it is widely 
preferred to use symmetric-key schemes for encryption and/or 
authentication over currently deployed communication 
networks. AES is currently the chosen standard for symmetric-
key classical block ciphers. Under the assumption that the best 
way to break a symmetric-key cryptographic scheme is 
exhaustive search within the key space4, then, a symmetric key 
modulus of 77 bits is roughly comparable, in terms of 
computational requirements, to an asymmetric key modulus of 
2048 bits . Note that doubling the length of a symmetric key 
implies squaring the computational efforts needed for 
exhaustive search; on the other hand, the computational efforts 
scale not as fast with key length in the case of asymmetric 
cryptography. 
 
5.NTRU 
Description of NTRU :- NTRU is based on the algebraic 
structures of certain polynimal rings.The ‘hard problem” on 
which NTRU is based is the Short Vector Problem (finding a 
short vector in a lattice). 
a. Notation. Before we proceed, we set some notation. The 
following are all part of the domain parameters for an 
implementation of NTRU. 
n    The dimension of the polynomial ring used in NTRU. (The 
polynominals will have degree n-1.) 
p     A positive integer specifying a ring Z/PZ over which the 
coefficients of a  certain product of polynomials will be 
reduced during the encryption and  decryption processes. 
q      A positive integer specifying a ring Z/qZ over which the 
coefficients of a certain product of polynomials will be 
reduced during the encryption and decryption processes, 
also used in the construction of the public key. 
k     A security parameter which controls resistance to certain 
types of attack  including plain text awareness. 
df    The distribution of the coefficients of the polynomial f, 
below (f is part of the    private key). 
dg    The distribution of the coefficients of the polynomial g, 
below(g is used to construct the public key). 
dr The number of  1s and -1s used in a certain random 
polynomial r, below , in  the encryption process. 
We will also use the following notation. 
f  A polynomial in [ ]
XZ  (Xn—1) 
fp  A polynomial in 
[ ]XZ /(p,Xn-1)        this is part of the 
private key). This polynomial is obtained by reducing the 
coefficients of  f modulo p. 
fq  A polynomial in 
[ ]XZ /(q,Xn-1). This polynomial is  
obained by reducing  the coefficients of f  modulo q. 
Lf  The set of polynomials in 
[ ]XZ /(xn-1) whose coefficients 
satisfy df . 
 A polynomial in [ ]
XZ /(q,Xn-1) (used with fq to construct 
the public key). 
Lg      The set of polynomials in 
[ ]XZ /(xn-1) whose cofficients 
satisfy dg . 
Lr  The set of polynomials in 
[ ]XZ /(xn-1) whose coefficients 
satisfy dr .  
fp
-1
.     The inverse of fq  in 
[ ]XZ / (q, Xn-1). 
h   The public key, a polynomial in [ ]
XZ /(q,Xn-1). 
r      A polynomial in [ ]
XZ  (q,Xn-1 (used with h to encode a 
message). 
m    The plaintext message, a polynomial in [ ]
XZ / (p,Xn-1). 
e     The encrypted message, a polynomial in [ ]
XZ /(q,Xn-1). 
G   A generating  function (defined below). 
H      A hashing function (defined below). 
 
Case 2 and 3 show that none of the operations used in the key 
generation process is effective if the cipher key is made of all 
0’s or all 1’s.  These types of cipher keys  need to be avoided, 
as discussed in Chapter 6. 
S-DES is very vulnerable to brute-force attack because of its 
key size (10bits) 
Throughout this paper, we work in the ring 
[ ] ( )/ 1nR X x= -¢
. An element f RÎ  will be written as 
a polynormal or a vector.  
[ ]
1
0 1 1
0
, ,........,
n
i
i n
i
f f x f f f
-
-
=
= =å
 
We write * to denote multiplication in R. This star 
multiplication is given explicitly as a cyclic convolution 
product,  
f g h* =  with 
1
0 1 mod
.
k n
k i k i i n k i i j
i i k i j k n
h f g f g f g
-
- + -
= = + + =
= + =å å å
 
When we do a multiplication modulo (say) q, we mean to 
reduce the coefficients modulo q, so the result lies in 
[ ] ( )/ , 1nX q X -¢ .  
Remark. The naive computation of a product *f S  requires 
2n  multiplications. However, in a typical product used by 
NTRU, one of f  or g  has small coefficients that are all 0’s 
and 1'± s, so *f g  may be computed extremely rapidly. 
Further, for large values of n  one may choose n  to be highly 
divisible by 2, in which case the convolution product can be 
computed in O  ( )logn n operations by using Fast Fourier 
Transforms.  
 In addition to this convolution product, there are two other 
operations we need to define on rings of polynomials. These 
are a generating function and a hashing function. They are 
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required in order to build a digital envelope into the NTRU 
protocol. We first let  
( )pP n = {polynomials of degree at most 1n -  with 
mode p  coefficients}, and we will write. 
[ ]pg  { g  with its coefficients reduced modulo p  into the 
range ( )/ 2, / 2p p- }. 
 We may now describe more precisely what we mean by a 
generating function G and a hashing function H,  
( ) ( ): p pG P N P N®  and 
( ) ( ) ( ): p p pH P N P N P K´ ®  
 These should be easy to compute, highly non-linear and 
unpredictable. There are numerous examples of such 
functions, constructed out of shits and other primitive 
operations, in the literature.  
 The NTRU PKC digital, envelope depends on the choice 
of the functions G and H, and on an integer k. The probability 
of forging a valid ciphertext will be kp- .  
 Remark : The original presentation of NTRU [HPS] did 
not suggest the use of a digital envelope (i.e., in the present 
discussion, both G and H would be functions which, no matter 
what the input, produce an output of 0). This provides an 
insecure digital envelope as described in [NT7] (cf.[BKS]). 
 Key Creation. To create an NTRU key, Bob randomly choose 
2 polynomials ff LÎ  and gg LÎ . The polynomial f must 
satisfy the additional requirement that it have inverses modulo 
q and modulo p. For suitable parameter choices, this will be 
true for most choices of f  (see [NT9]), and the actual 
computation of these inverses is easy using a modification of 
the Euclidean algorithm (see [NT1, NT14] for details). As 
noted above, we will denote these inverses by 1qf
-  and 1pf
- , 
that is  
1) 1 * 1qf f
- º  mod q  and 1 * 1pf f
- º  mod p  
 Bob next computes the quantity  
2)  1 *qh pf g
-º  mod q . 
Bob’s public key is the polynomial h . Bob’s private key is the 
polynomial f , although in practice he will also want to 
store 1pf
- . For an extremely efficient algorithm to compute 
1
pf
-  and 1qf
- , please see [NT14]; for an efficient algorithm 
for multiplication, please see [NT10]  
 Encryption. We now describe how Alice wraps and sends a 
message to Bob using Bo’s NTRU public key h . Alice 
chooses her plaintext m  from the set 
( )pm P n kÎ -  
She also choosen a random polynomial rr LÎ . She computes  
[ ]( ) [ ]( )
( )
* , * *
mod
n k
p p
p
e r h m H m r h X G r h
q
-é ùº + + +
ë û  
Sender then sends e  to Receiver.  
 
6.1. Decryption. Suppose that Bob has received the message 
e  from Alice and wants to decrypt it using his private key f . 
To do this efficiently, Bob should have precomputed the 
polynomial 1pf
-  described in Section 1.1. 
 In order to decrypt e , Bob first computes the 
temporary polynomial a  by  
* mod ,a f e qº    Throughout this paper , we work in 
the ring R = [ ]
XZ /(Xn-1). An element f € R 
Will be written as a polynomial or a vector. 
                   f = i x
i =  [ f0, f1,…….,fn-1] .where he 
chooses the coefficients of a  in the interval from / 2q- to 
/ 2q . Now treating a  as polynomial with integer 
coefficients, Bob computes the temporary polynomial 
[ ] ( )/ , 1nt X p XÎ -¢
  
1
pt f a
-= Ä
 (mod p ),  
Further computes the two temporary quantities b e tº -  
(mod p ) and  ( )c t G bº -  (mod p ),  
And then writes c in the form 
" n kc c X -= +  with 
deg
( )'c n k< -
 and deg
( )" .c k<
 
(Note that the quantity b is supposed to play the role of 
[ ] .pr h*  Finally, he compares the quantities. 
"c  and  ( )
' , .H c b
 
If they are the same, he accepts 
'c  as a valid decryption. 
Otherwise he rejects the message as invalid.  
Remark. For appropriate parameter values, there is an 
extremely high probability that the decryption procedure will 
recover the original message. However, some parameter  
choices may cause occasional decryption failure, so one 
should probably include a few check bits in each message 
block. The usual cause of decryption failure will be that the 
message is improperly centered. In this case Bob will be able 
to recover the message by choosing the coefficients of 
a f eº Ä  mod q  in a slightly different interval, for 
example from / 2q x- +  to / 2q x+  for some small 
(positive or negative) value of .x  If not value or x  works, 
then we say that we have gap failure and the message cannot 
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be decrypted as easily. For well-chosen parameter values, this 
will occur so rarely that it can be ignored in practice.  
 
 6.Why Decryption Works.  The polynomial a that Bob 
computes satisfies  
a f eº Ä  
mod q ) 
 1qf pr f g
-= Ä Ä Ä +  
[ ]( ) [ ], (n kp p
p
f m H m r h X G r h-é ùÄ + Ä + Äë û
 
mod q  
From (1),  
   pr g f= Ä + Ä  
[ ]( ) [ ]( )n kp p pm H m r h X G r h
-é ù+ Ä + Äë û From (2).  
Consider this last polynomial. For appropriate parameter 
choices, we can ensure that (almost always) all of its 
coefficients lie between / 2q-  and  / 2q , so that it doesn’t 
change if its coefficients are reduced modulo q . This means 
that when Bob reduces the coefficients of  f eÄ  modulo q  
into the interval from / 2q-  and  / 2q , he recovers exactly 
the polynomial.  
a pr g f= Ä + Ä  
[ ]( ) [ ]( )ni kp p pm H m r h X G r h
-é ù+ Ä + Äë û in 
R .  
Reducing a  modulo p  then gives him the 
polynomial
[ ]( ), ([ ]n k pp
p
f m H m r h X G r h-é ùÄ + Ä + Äë û
 in ,R  
And then multiplying by 
1
pf
-
 produces 
( ,[ ] ) ([ ] )n kp pt m H m r h X G r h
-= + Ä + Ä
 in 
[ ] ( )/ , 1 .nX p X -¢
 
 Thus when Bob computes b e t= -  above, he is 
really recovering .b r h= Ä  
Therefore his    computation of c  yields 
[ ]( ), .n kpc m H m r h X -= + Ä   
Accordingly, 'c  is the original message ,m  and 
nc  should 
match up with the hash  
( ,[ ] ) ( , ),pH m r h H m bÄ =  as 
noted above.  
  
Parameter choices – notation and a norm estimate.  We 
define the width of an element f RÎ  to be 
{ } { }
0 1 0 1
max max .i i
i n i n
f f f
¥ £ £ - £ £ -
= -
 
As our notation suggests, this is a sort of  L
¥
 norm on R . 
Similarly, we define a centered 
2L norm on R by 
1/221
2 0
,
n
i
i
f f f
- -
=
æ öæ ö= å -ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øè ø where 
1
0
1
.
n
i
f fi
n
- -
=
= å
 
(Equivalently, 2
/f n
 is the standard deviation of the 
coefficients of .)F  The following proposition was suggested 
to us by Don Coppersmith.  
Proposition.  For any 0Î> there are constants 1, 2 0,g g >  
depending on Î  and N, such that for randomly chosen 
polynomials , ,f g RÎ  the probability is greater than 1-Î 
that they satisfy 
1 22 2 2 2
.f g f g f gg g
¥
£ Ä £
 
  Of course, this proposition would be useless form a 
practical viewpoint if the ratio 2 1
/g g
 were very large fro 
small ' .sÎ  However, it turns out that even for moderately 
large values on N  and very small values of ,Î  the constants 
1 2,g g  are not at all extreme. We have verified this 
experimentally for a large number of parameter values.  
 Sample spaces.  The space of messages m
L
consists of all 
polynomials modulo .p  Assuming p  is odd, it is most 
convenient to take 
( ) ( )
:
1 1
1 1 deg 1
2 2
m
m R m has coefficients lyingbetween
L p and p and has ree at most n k
Îì ü
ï ïï ï= - - - - -í ý
ï ï
ï ïî þ
 
To describe the other sample spaces, we will use sets of the 
form 
1
1 2
2
: 1,
( , ) .
1, 0
f R f has d coefficients equal
L d d
d coefficientsequal the rest
Îì ü
=í ý-î þ  
With this notation, we choose three positive integers 
, ,f g rd d d  and set 
( ), 1 ,f f fL L d d= -    ( ), ,g g gL L d d=  and  
( ),r r rL L d d= . 
(The reason we don’t set 
( ),f f fL L d d=  is because we 
want f  to be invertible, and a polynomial satisfying 
(1) 0f =  can never be invertible) Notice that ,ff LÎ  
,gg LÎ  and rr LÎ  have 2L  norms 
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1
2
2 1 ,ff d n
-= - -
       2
2 ,gg d=          
2
2 .rr d=  
Later we will give values for 
, ,f g rd d d  that allow decryption 
while maintaining various security levels.  
  
A Decryption Criterion.  To ease notation, we let 
[ ]( ) [ ]( )' , n kp p
p
m m H m r h X G r h-é ù= + Ä + Äë û Be 
the polynomial used by Alice for encryption. (That is, 
'e r h mº Ä +  mod .)q In order for the decryption process 
to work, it is necessary that  
' .f m pr g q
¥
Ä + Ä <
 
We have found that this will virtually always be true if we 
choose parameters so that 
' / 4f m q
¥
Ä £
    and   
/ 4;pr g q
¥
Ä £
 
In view of the above Proposition, this suggests  that we take 
(3) 22 2
/ 4f m q g»
   and    22 2
/ 4r g q pg»
 
for a 2
g
 corresponding to a small value for Î . For example, 
experimental evidence suggests that for 167N =  and 
503.N = appropriate values for 2g  are 0.27 and 0.17 
respectively.  
 
Table : Table shows three cases of key generation- 
Steps Illustration 
Cipher Key 
Absorbing  
Squeezing  
Squeezing  
1011100110 
1100101110 
L: 11001    
R : 01110 
0000000000 
0000000000 
L : 00000     
R : 00000 
1111111111 
1111111111 
L : 11111    
R : 11111 
Round 1 : 
Shifted Keys : 
Combined Key 
: 
Round Key 1 : 
 
L : 10011    
R : 11100 
1001111100 
101111100 
 
L : 00000    
R : 00000 
0000000000 
0000000000 
 
L : 11111     
R : 11111 
1111111111 
1111111111 
Round 2 : 
Shifted Keys 
: 
Combined 
Keys : 
Round Key : 
2 
 
L ; 01110     
R : 10011 
0111010011 
11010011 
 
L : 00000     
R : 00000 
0000000000 
0000000000 
 
L : 11111       
R : 11111 
1111111111 
1111111111 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper we propose the secret message transmission 
between group using sponge function technique, every user 
has to register in order to communicate in the group. This 
entire process will be examined in KDC(Key Distribution 
Center) based on NTRU Technique. The Encryption and 
Decryption will be taken place. 
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